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OPTIMIZING PERFORMANCE OF TRAINEES FOR UAS MANPOWER, INTERFACE AND SELECTION
(OPTUMIS): A HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (HSI) APPROACH
Ms. Jennifer Pagan
Dr. Randy Astwood
CDR Henry Phillips
Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division
Orlando, Florida
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) operations research by Williams (2004) found that platforms
which employ winged aviators (e.g., Predator) have shown higher mishaps than those that select
operators that are nonpilots (e.g., Shadow). One explanation may be negative training transfer
from manned to unmanned platforms as operators are separated from the aircraft, thus depriving
them of a range of sensory cues (McCarley & Wickens, 2007). Another explanation for higher
Predator mishaps may be associated with poor Ground Control Station (GCS) design. These
varying explanations for differences in mishap rates across platforms indicate the need to address a
number of Human System Integration (HSI) issues including manpower/personnel, training, and
design issues. Thus, this presentation discusses an effort investigating which UAS Knowledge,
Skills, and Abilities, (KSAs) support the identification and training of candidates best suited to
operate UASs. In addition, GCS design considerations directly linked to task workload and KSAs
are discussed.
Authors’ Note. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official
position of the organizations with which they are affiliated.
Human Systems Integration (HSI) is the multi-disciplinary marriage of systems engineering and behavioral science
(Bost & Miller, 2003). HSI seeks to address issues associated with how the human interacts with other system
elements (e.g., hardware/software) to ensure effective performance and safety. Within the DoD HSI consists of a
number of disciplines including manpower/personnel, training, safety and health, habitability, survivability, and
Human Factors (Bost & Miller, 2003). Manpower/Personnel addresses all aspects of defining requirements for
personnel including selecting and retaining those individuals. Training seeks to equip personnel with the necessary
KSAs for successful mission completion. Safety and health, habitability, and survivability seek to ensure that
systems are designed to minimize personnel risk of injury and error, ensure that all aspects of the working spaces are
designed with personnel in mind, and provide personnel with all requisite personal protection needed. Lastly, the
Human Factors (HF) component of HSI seeks to ensure that all aspects of the system are designed with the full
consideration of the inherent capabilities and limitations of personnel.
Research on UAS mishaps has begun to uncover fundamental HSI problems associated with selection, training, and
design for UAS operations. Specifically, Williams (2004) found that UAS platforms utilizing winged aviators as
operators (i.e., Predator) have significantly more HF related accidents than those operated by enlisted personnel (i.e.,
Shadow). Investigation of Predator accidents indicates issues concerning instrumentation, sensory feedback systems,
and channelized attention. Conversely, Shadow HF accidents were found to be related to procedural guidance and
publications, training issues, overconfidence and crew resource management (Thompson, Tvaryanas, & Constable,
2005). Although this comparison is of UASs from different groups, with Predators (Group IV) flying higher and
faster than Shadows (Group III), this difference is unlikely to change the underlying HF issues associated with
flying beyond visual range. One explanation for these findings may be negative training transfer from manned to
unmanned platforms as operators are separated from the aircraft, thus depriving them of a range of sensory cues
(McCarley & Wickens, 2007). This separation of aircraft and pilot puts winged aviators in a situation in which they
are unable to employ the psychomotor skills that have been trained into automaticity (Grier et al., 2003), suggesting
that winged aviators may not necessarily have the right competencies (i.e., KSAs) to operate a UAS. Additionally,
Pagan et al. (2014) and Triplett (2008) found that there are core manned aviator KSAs that go unused when
operating UASs (e.g., cognitive/spatial, physical/perceptual, and personality based competencies).
While researchers have begun to address who should operate UASs (e.g., McKinley, McIntire, & Funke, 2009;
Pagan et al., 2014; Triplett, 2008), selection is only one component to addressing UAS mishaps from the HSI
perspective. Another critical aspect is system design as multiple studies have cited confusion with interface and

automation modes and difficulty with system management as primary causes for Predator HF related mishaps
(Nullmeyer, Montijo, Herz, & Leonik, 2007; Thompson et al., 2005; Tvaryanas & Thompson, 2008).
These varying explanations for varying mishap rates across platforms, coupled with the fact that accident rates for
Global Hawk, Predator, and Reaper are still three times higher than any other category of aircraft within the U.S. Air
Force (Bloomberg, 2012) suggest further research is warranted. Specifically, research is necessary to identify the
right individuals with the capabilities to acquire UAS specific skills and ensure they are trained to the appropriate
KSAs, as well as to derive GCS design guidance that is optimized in a manner that improves overall safety and
performance. The Optimizing Performance of Trainees for UAS Manpower, Interface and Selection (OPTUMIS)
effort was developed to address these HSI concerns. OPTUMIS consists of three phases: 1) KSA Comparison
(manned vs. unmanned), 2) Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) KSA Classification (select, train, design), and 3)
Performance Differences. This paper describes preliminary results from the second phase of this research effort.
Specifically, this paper will discusses our attempt to identify those KSAs that should be used for selection and those
that should be used for training U.S. Navy UAS AVOs, as well as discusses UAS GCS design considerations that
are directly linked to UAS operator task workload.
Method
Measures
Job Task Analyses (JTAs). The Analysis of Cross-Platform Naval Unmanned Aircraft System Task and
Competency Requirements (Mangos, Vincenzi, Shrader, Williams, & Arnold, 2012) was used to identify UAS
AVOs tasks and requisite KSAs. This JTA focused on all major UAS systems actively used by the U.S. Navy and
Marine Corps. This JTA identified 256 general and system-specific operator (i.e., crew member, by position) tasks
and 67 requisite KSAs across platforms. The Mangos et al., 2012 JTA also provided task difficulty, importance, and
frequency SME ratings as well as KSA SME importance ratings. Additionally, a qualitative analysis of existing
UAS JTAs was conducted to ensure a comprehensive list of KSAs was included for further analyses. 1 This analysis
identified another 42 requisite KSAs bringing the total to 109 UAS cross-platform relevant competencies.
Existing Measures for Selection, Training, and Design Classification. An analysis of existing methods
for providing selection, training, and system design guidance that is linked directly to requisite tasks and KSAOs
was conducted. This analysis involved three steps: 1) identifying overlap among existing methods, 2) identifying
unique methods, and 3) expanding/developing a model for design guidance. Results from this analysis deemed it
necessary to expand the Brannick and Levine (2002) model for training and selection guidance to include design
guidance. This updated model was used to develop techniques and collect required KSA and task information (e.g.,
ranking, categorizing, and elaborating) from UAS SMEs in order to obtain selection, training, and GCS design
recommendations.
AVO KSA Classification Survey. The AVO KSA Classification Survey was developed utilizing the
Brannick and Levine (2002) model for KSA Selection and Training classification. Each KSA was presented with a
definition and SMEs were asked to provide consensus ratings for each KSA on four scales:
• Necessary: Is the attribute necessary for newly hired employees to possess upon entering the job? This is a
dichotomous, yes/no response.
• Practical: Is the attribute practical to expect of incoming employees in the current labor market? Also a
dichotomous, yes/no response.
• Trouble Likely: To what extent is trouble on the job likely if this attribute is ignored in selection (compared with
the other attributes)? This is a 5-point scale ranging from “very little or none” (1) to “an extremely great extent”
(5).
• Superior from Average. To what extent do different levels of the KSA distinguish the superior from the average
operator (compared to the other KSAs)? The Superior from Average scale was rated on the same 5-point scale
as the Trouble Likely scale.

1

Due to space limitations a complete listing of UAS JTAs utilized for this effort was not provided. For a complete
listing of utilized UAS JTAs please contact the study authors.

Participants
Seven U.S. Navy UAS operators were asked to provide consensus ratings for the AVO KSA Classification Survey.
Operators’ backgrounds consisted of AVOs (2), Mission Commanders (3), and a Sensor Operator (1). Their
experience ranged from 10 months to 3.5 years in Groups III -V (e.g. Shadow, Fire Scout, Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance Demonstrator [BAMS-D]).
Results
A multi-pronged approached was used to classify KSAs into selection, training, or design categories. First, data
from the KSA Classification Survey was used to classify selection and training categories.
Selection. KSAs were classified as required for selection based on the Brannick and Levine (2002)
criteria: KSAs rated as “Necessary”, “Practical”, and 1.5 or higher on the “Trouble Likely” scale. Subsequently,
selection KSAs were ranked based on a weighted score derived from multiplying scores on the “Trouble Likely”
scale by scores on the “Superior from Average” scale (Brannick & Levine, 2002). Next, the “select to” KSAs were
cross referenced with the KSA importance ratings from the Mangos et al., 2012 JTA to ensure all selection KSAs
were rated as greater than moderately important on the five point importance scale used (i.e., 3.5 or greater). Finally,
KSAs that were considered to be minimum qualifications for job performance we removed (e.g., general health,
dynamic flexibility). The resulting KSAs are presented in Table 1. The KSAs presented in Table 1 are broken into
four tiers. KSAs within a tier are grouped by importance ranking for selection (i.e., Tier 1 KSAs are most valuable
for selection of UAS operators and Tier 4 are least valuable).
Table 1.
UAS Operator "Select To" KSAs
Tier 1
Dependable
Self-Discipline

Auditory
Attention
/Localization

Tier 2
Rule Abiding

Tier 3
Interpersonal
Skills

Learning Ability
Cooperation

Accountability

Finger Dexterity

Mathematical
Ability

Wrist-Finger
Speed

Control
Precision

Multi-limb
Coordination

Manual
Dexterity

Vigilance

Numerical
Reasoning

Tier 4
Oral Expression
Oral
Comprehension

Listening Skills

Work Motivation
Perseverance
Straightforward-ness
Cohesiveness

Resilience
Hand-Eye
Coordination
Reaction Time

Extraversion
Moral Interest
Attention to
Detail

Information
Management
Skills

Training. Next, KSAs required for training were classified and ranked using the Brannick and Levine,
2002 methodology: KSAs were classified for training if they were rated as not “Necessary” and given a greater than
1.5 rating on the “Superior from Average” scale; training KSAs were then ranked based on their “Superior from
Average” score. Then these KSAs were cross-referenced with the Mangos et al., 2012 KSA importance ratings. The
resulting “train to” KSAs are presented in Table 2.

Table 2.
UAS Operator “Train To” KSAs
Tier 1
Deliberation

Planning

Adaptability

Safety Consciousness

Stress Tolerance

Systems
Comprehension

Handling Crisis
Disengagement

Technical
Troubleshooting

Tier 2

Tier 3

Threat Categories
and Indicators

Mechanical
Comprehension

Confidence

Reconnaissance
Procedures

Perceptual Speed and
Accuracy

Depth Perception

Engagement
Procedures

Response Selection

Stamina

Long-Term Memory

Organization Skills
Meteorology

Working Memory

Decision Making

Initiative

Energy

Concentration/
Selection Attention

Leadership

Aeronautical
Terminology
Flight Rules and
Regulations

Map Reading

Critical Thinking
Skills
Reasoning Skills

Assertiveness
Attention Allocation

Time Management
Skills

Information
Orderings

Problem Solving Skills

Task Prioritization
Navigation Skills

Unit/Command
Objectives

Spatial Orientation

Aviation Principles

Spatial Visualization

Basic Operation
Procedure

Rate Control
Situational
Awareness

Teamwork Skills

Originality

Helpfulness

Category Flexibility

Resolving Conflicts

Mental Rotation
UAS Operations2
Communication
Procedures
2

Arm-handedness

UAS Operations includes navigation, sensors, and weapons knowledge.

Design Guidance. The Brannick and Levine (2002) method was also used to identify KSAs relevant to
performance that SMEs determined should be addressed through system design rather than through training or
selection. This list included any KSA that was rated highly on the “Superior from Average” scale (rating of 3 or
greater) but not considered “Necessary” or “Practical”, and that was rated low on the “Trouble Likely” scale (i.e.,
not a candidate for training). The only KSAs that met these criteria and were placed in the “design to” category
among the 109 KSAs were Flexibility of Closure (i.e., identifying/detecting known patterns [e.g., figure, word,
object] that are hidden in other material) and Pattern Recognition (i.e., detecting a known pattern [e.g., a numerical
code]; combining and organizing different pieces of information into a meaningful pattern quickly).
The project team is currently adapting the Brannick and Levine (2002) method to include workload ratings tied
directly to individual tasks. Workload ratings provided for those UAS Cross Platform JTA tasks during which the
AVO has direct interaction with the system (amounting to 188 of the original 256) are currently being evaluated to
identify the optimal candidate tasks for incorporation into automation evaluations. These data are currently being
collected and will further inform system design guidance.

Implications
Our analysis found a number of general competencies that should be considered when developing selection and
training protocols for UAS AVOs in order to avoid costly mishaps. These competencies are ranked by importance to
provide cost-benefit guidance to selection and training decision makers. For example, if funding constraints prevent
decision makers from implementing a selection test battery that measures all of the KSAs identified in Table 1 then
they can at minimum ensure that a sampling of the Tier 1 competencies are utilized. Additionally, our guidance can
be used as a gap analysis tool for current UAS selection and training protocols. Decision makers can use this
guidance to ensure that their current selection and training protocols include those KSAs identified in our analysis.
These protocols can then be updated accordingly depending on the individual programs requirements and funding.
The methodology used for the initial “design to” competency analysis identified two KSAs (i.e., Flexibility of
Closure and Pattern Recognition) that SMEs reported cannot reliably be addressed through selection or training.
While all other KSAs should be considered during the design process, Flexibility of Closure and Pattern
Recognition should be considered critical from a GCS design perspective as they adhere to the principles of HSI. For
example, the literature has shown that systems can be designed to allow operators to more easily recognize patterns
to improve the quality of their decision making and performance (Cummings, Bruni, Mercier, & Mitchell, 2007).
Additionally, we are in the process of expanding our analysis to the task level to provide a more robust set of design
guidelines linked to both tasks and KSAs.
Limitations
As previously mentioned our effort sought to provide platform agnostic guidance. However, one must not blindly
follow the guidance provided. Selection, training, and system developers must be sure that when developing these
protocols and technologies the individual competencies indeed meet their platform requirements. For example,
Wrist-Finger Speed and Arm Handedness were identified as Tier 1 competencies; however, these may only be
relevant to UAS platforms that use joystick interfaces.
Moreover, the sample used to develop this guidance was service specific, consisting of seven Navy operators with
Group 3-5 experience and may not be generalizable to other services or smaller platforms. Further, it is important to
note that these findings are preliminary, as the small sample size warrants the need for additional data points.
Additionally, these rating Finally, further research is necessary to better understand the empirical implications from
this guidance. Empirical investigation will provide insight as to whether selecting, training, and designing to these
specific competencies will in fact improve operator performance and in turn reduce UAS mishaps.
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